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Guillaume Aucher An Internal Version of
Epistemic Logic
Abstract. Representing an epistemic situation involving several agents obviously de-
pends on the modeling point of view one takes. We start by identifying the types of mod-
eling points of view which are logically possible. We call the one traditionally followed
by epistemic logic the perfect external approach, because there the modeler is assumed
to be an omniscient and external observer of the epistemic situation. In the rest of the
paper we focus on what we call the internal approach, where the modeler is one of the
agents involved in the situation. For this approach we propose and axiomatize a logical
formalism based on epistemic logic. This leads us to formalize some intuitions about the
internal approach and about its connections with the external ones. Finally, we show that
our internal logic is decidable and PSPACE-complete.
Keywords: Epistemic logic, multi-agent systems, internal approach.
1. Introduction
In the literature about epistemic logic, when it comes to model epistemic
situations, not much is said explicitly about which modeling point of view
is considered. However, modeling an epistemic situation depends very much
on the modeling point of view. Indeed, the models built to represent the
situation will be quite different depending on whether the modeler is an agent
involved in the situation or not. To illustrate this point, let us consider
the following example. Assume that the agents Yann and Alice are in a
room and that there is a coin in a box that both cannot see because the
box is closed. Now, assume that Alice cheats, opens the box and looks at
the coin. Moreover, assume that Yann does not suspect anything about
it and that Alice knows it (Yann might be inattentive or out of the room
for a while). How can we represent this resulting situation? On the one
hand, if the modeler is an external observer (different from Yann and Alice)
knowing everything that has happened, then in the model that this external
observer builds Alice knows whether the coin is heads or tails up. On the
other hand, if the modeler is Yann then in the model that Yann builds
Alice does not know whether the coin is heads or tails up. As we see in
this example,the intuitive interpretation of a model really makes sense only
when one knows the modeling point of view.
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The importance of specifying a modeling point of view is also stressed at a
great extent in Newtonian mechanics in physics where physicists must always
specify which frame of reference they consider when they want to study a
natural phenomenon. And just as for epistemic situations, the representation
of this phenomenon depends very much on this frame of reference. For
example, assume somebody drops a ball from the top of the high mast of a
ship sailing nearby a harbor. Then, viewed from the frame of reference of
the ship, the trajectory of the ball will be a straight line. But viewed from
the frame of reference of the harbor, the trajectory will be a parabola (the
more rapidly the ship sails and the higher the mast is, the more curved the
parabola will be).
Given an epistemic situation, assume that we want to model the beliefs of
the agents G = {j1, . . . , jN} and possibly the actual state of the world. What
kinds of modeling points of view are there? For a start, we can distinguish
whether or not the modeler is one of these agents G under scrutiny.
1. First, consider the case where the modeler is one of the agents G. In
the rest of the paper we call this modeler-agent agent Y (like Y ou). The
models she builds could be seen as models she has ‘in her mind’. They
represent the way she perceives the surrounding world. In that case,
agent Y is involved in the situation, she is considered on a par by the
other agents and interacts with them. So she should be represented in
the formalism and her models should deal not only with the other agents’
beliefs but also with the other agents’ beliefs about her own beliefs. This
is an internal and subjective point of view, the situation is modeled from
the inside. Therefore, for this very reason her beliefs might be erroneous.
Hence the models she builds might also be erroneous. We call this agent
point of view the internal point of view.
2. Second, consider the case where the modeler is not one of the agents G.
The modeler is thus an observer external to the situation. She is not
involved in the situation and she does not exist for the agents, or at least
she is not taken into consideration in their representation of the world.
So she should not be represented in the formalism and particularly the
agents’ beliefs about her own beliefs should also not be represented. The
models that this modeler builds are supposed to represent the situation
‘from above’, from an external and objective point of view. There are
then two other sub-possibilities depending on whether or not the modeler
has a perfect knowledge of the situation.
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(a) In case the modeler has a perfect knowledge of the situation, then
everything that is true in the model that she builds is true in reality
and vice versa, everything that is true in reality is also true in the
model. This thesis was already introduced in [5]. Basically, the
models built by the modeler are perfectly correct. The modeler has
access to the minds of the agents and knows perfectly not only what
they believe but also what the actual state of the world is. This is a
kind of ‘divine’ point of view and we call it the perfect external point
of view.
(b) In case the modeler does not have a perfect knowledge of the situation
then, like the internal point of view but unlike the perfect external
point of view, the models built might be erroneous. The models could
also be correct but then, typically, the modeler would be uncertain
about which is the actual world (in that sense, she would not have
a perfect knowledge of the situation). What the modeler knows can
be obtained for example by observing what the agents say and do,
by asking them questions. . .We call this point of view the imperfect
external point of view.
Because we proceeded by successive dichotomies, we claim that the in-
ternal, the perfect external and the imperfect external points of view are the
only three logically possible points of view when we want to model epistemic
situations. From now on we will call these modeling approaches the inter-
nal, the external and the imperfect external approaches; their differences are
summarized in Figure 1.1
the modeler is uncertain the modeler is
about the situation one of the agents
internal approach • •
imperfect external approach •
perfect external approach
Figure 1. Essential differences between the internal and external approaches
1In [24], the internal and external points of view are studied from a broader philosoph-
ical perspective and not just for their need in representing agents’ beliefs. Nagel mainly
deals there with the issues of how these views can be combined and if they can possibly
be integrated. He does so by tracing the manifestations of these issues in a number of
philosophical topics: the metaphysics of mind, the theory of knowledge, free will, and
ethics. He argues that giving a complete account of reality (as in philosophy of mind) or
of all reasons for actions (as in ethics) in objective terms only is not always possible.
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The fields of application of these three approaches are different. The inter-
nal and imperfect external approaches have rather applications in artificial
intelligence where agents/robots acting in the world need to have a for-
mal representation of the surrounding world and to cope with uncertain
information. The internal approach has also applications in cognitive psy-
chology where the aim is to model the cognition of one agent (possibly in a
multi-agent setting). The perfect external approach has rather applications
in game theory [7], social psychology (distributed cognition) or distributed
systems [14] for example. Indeed, in these fields we need to model situations
accurately from an external point of view in order to explain and predict
what happens in these situations.
The modeling point of view is definitely not the only important factor
to specify when one wants to model epistemic situations: the second im-
portant factor is obviously our object of study, i.e. what we actually model.
Typically, it is the actual state of the world and the beliefs of the agents G
about each other. But this could also perfectly be their beliefs about other
agents j′1, . . . , j
′
N ′ or the beliefs of only some of these agents G (about all
the agents G) for instance. Therefore, to proceed methodically and properly
(and similarly as in physics), when one wants to model epistemic situations
one should ideally specify from the start a combination of these two fac-
tors. Indeed, each combination gives rise to a particular kind of formalism.
However some combinations might turn out to be equivalent to others: for
example, if the object of study is the epistemic state of a single agent Y (in
a single or a multi-agent setting), then the perfect external approach for this
object of study amounts to the internal approach where the modeler-agent
is Y herself and the object of study is the actual state of the world (and
possibly the other agents’ beliefs about each other in a multi-agent setting).
This example suggests that the internal approach is somehow reducible to
the perfect external approach if we specify appropriate objects of study.
But because the corresponding object of study in the external approach of a
given object of study in the internal approach might be quite convoluted in
some cases we prefer to keep the natural and intuitive distinction between
the internal and the perfect external approaches.
In the logical literature, some combinations have been already studied.
In [6, 25, 9], the authors follow the imperfect external approach in a sin-
gle agent setting and model only the epistemic state of this single agent.
Standard epistemic logic [18] follows the external approach in a multi-agent
setting and models the epistemic states of all the agents together with the
actual state of the world. On the other hand, AGM belief revision theory [1]
follows the internal approach but in a single agent setting. In fact there is
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no logical formalism that follows the internal approach in a multi-agent set-
ting where the modeler-agent Y models the epistemic states of all the agents
together with the actual state of the world. However, such a formalism is
crucial if we want to design autonomous agents for instance. That is what
we are going to propose in this paper.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we recall epistemic logic.
In Section 3 we propose a semantics for the internal approach in a multi-agent
setting. Then in Section 4 we set some connections between the internal and
the external approaches. Finally, in Section 5 we propose an axiomatization
of the internal semantics.
Note 1.1. All the proofs of this paper can be found at the address
http://publications.uni.lu/record/3516/files/StudiaLogica.pdf.
2. Epistemic logic
Epistemic logic is a modal logic [8] that is concerned with the logical study
of the notions of knowledge and belief. So what we call an epistemic model
is just a particular kind of Kripke model as used in modal logic. The only
difference is that instead of having a single accessibility relation we have a
set of accessibility relations, one for each agent. This set of agents is noted
G and its cardinality N . Besides, Φ is a set of propositional letters.
Definition 2.1. An epistemic model M is a tripleM = (W,R, V ) such that
• W is a non-empty set of possible worlds;
• R : G→ 2W×W assigns an accessibility relation to each agent;
• V : Φ→ 2W assigns a set of possible world to each propositional letter.
If M = (W,R, V ) is an epistemic model, a pair (M,wa) with wa ∈ W is
called a pointed epistemic model. We also note Rj = R(j) and Rj(w) =
{w′ ∈W ;wRjw
′}, and w ∈M for w ∈W .
Intuitively, a pointed epistemic model (M,wa) represents from an exter-
nal point of view how the actual world wa is perceived by all the agents G.
This entails that epistemic logic clearly follows the perfect external approach.
The possible worlds W are the relevant worlds needed to define such a rep-
resentation and the valuation V specifies which propositional facts (such as
‘it is raining’) are true in these worlds. Finally the accessibility relations Rj
model the notion of belief. We set w′ ∈ Rj(w) in case in world w, agent j
considers the world w′ possible.
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Finally, the submodel of M generated by a set of worlds S ⊆ M is the
restriction2 of M to the worlds {(
⋃
j∈G
Rj)
∗(wS);wS ∈ S} (where (
⋃
j∈G
Rj)
∗ is
the reflexive transitive closure of (
⋃
j∈G
Rj), see [8] for details). In case the
submodel of M generated by a set of worlds S ⊆ M is M itself then M is
said to be generated by S and in case S is a singleton it is called the root of
M . Intuitively, the submodel of M generated by a set of worlds S contains
all the relevant information in M about these worlds S.
Now inspiring ourselves from modal logic, we can define a language for
epistemic models which will enable us to express things about them. The
modal operator is then a ‘belief’ operator, one for each agent.
Definition 2.2. The language L is defined as follows:
L : φ ::= ⊤ | p | ¬φ | φ ∧ φ | Bjφ
where p ranges over Φ and j over G. Moreover, φ∨φ′ is an abbreviation for
¬(¬φ ∧ ¬φ′); φ→ φ′ is an abbreviation for ¬φ ∨ φ′; Bˆjφ is an abbreviation
for ¬Bj¬φ; and ⊥ is an abbreviation for ¬⊤.
Now we can give meaning to the formulas of this language by defining
truth conditions for these formulas on the class of epistemic models.
Definition 2.3. Let M = (W,R, V ) be an epistemic model and w ∈ W .
M,w |= φ is defined inductively as follows:
M,w |= ⊤
M,w |= p iff w ∈ V (p)
M,w |= ¬φ iff not M,w |= φ
M,w |= φ ∧ φ′ iff M,w |= φ and M,w |= φ′
M,w |= Bjφ iff for all v ∈ Rj(w),M, v |= φ
When M,w |= φ, we say that φ true in w or φ is satisfied in w. We write
M |= φ when M,w |= φ for all w ∈M .
So agent j believes φ in world w (formally M,w |= Bjφ) if φ is true in
all the worlds that the agent j considers possible (in world w).
2LetM = (W,R, V ) be an epistemic model. The restriction of M to a set of worlds S is
the submodel M ′ = (W ′, R′, V ′) of M defined as follows. W ′ =W ∩S; R′j = Rj ∩ (S×S)
for all j ∈ G; and V ′(p) = V (p) ∩ S for all p ∈ Φ.
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 
 w : p
Y,A 
Y,A
  
 v : ¬p
Y,A


Figure 2. Epistemic model
Example 2.4. In the pointed epistemic model (M,w) of Figure 2, p stands
for ‘the coin is heads up’. Y stands for Yann and A for Alice. Accessibility
relations are represented by arrows. So Yann does not know whether the
coin is heads or tails up: M,w |= ¬BY p ∧ ¬BY ¬p. Yann also believes that
Alice does not know neither: M,w |= BY (¬BAp ∧ ¬BA¬p). Finally, Yann
believes that Alice believes that he does not know whether the coin is heads
or tails up: M,w |= BYBA(¬BY ¬p ∧ ¬BY p).
But note that the notion of belief might comply to some constraints (or
axioms) such as Bjφ → BjBjφ: if agent j believes something, she ‘knows’
that she believes it. These constraints might affect the nature of the acces-
sibility relations Rj which may then comply to some extra properties. We
list here some properties that will be useful in the sequel: seriality: for all
w, Rj(w) = ∅; transitivity: for all w,w
′, w′′, if w′ ∈ Rj(w) and w
′′ ∈ Rj(w
′)
then w′′ ∈ Rj(w); euclidicity: for all w,w
′, w′′, if w′ ∈ Rj(w) and w
′′ ∈ Rj(w)
then w′ ∈ Rj(w
′′). Then we define the class of KD45G-models as the class of
epistemic models whose accessibility relations are serial, transitive and eu-
clidean. If for all KD45G-modelsM ,M |= φ then φ is said to be KD45G-valid
and it is noted |=KD45G φ.
Definition 2.5. The logic KD45G is defined by the following axiom schemes
and inference rules:
Taut ⊢KD45G φ for all propositional tautologies φ
K ⊢KD45G Bj(φ→ ψ)→ (Bjφ→ Bjψ) for all j ∈ G
D ⊢KD45G Bjφ→ Bˆjφ
4 ⊢KD45G Bjφ→ BjBjφ
5 ⊢KD45G ¬Bjφ→ Bj¬Bjφ
Nec If ⊢KD45G φ then ⊢KD45G Bjφ for all j ∈ G
MP If ⊢KD45G φ and ⊢KD45G φ→ ψ then ⊢KD45G ψ.
We write ⊢KD45G φ in case φ belongs to the logic KD45G and we say that φ
is provable in KD45G.
An interesting feature of epistemic (and modal) logic is that we can
somehow match the constraints imposed by the axioms on the belief oper-
ator Bj with constraints on the accessibility relations Rj. In other words,
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the notions of validity and provability coincide. That is what the following
theorem expresses.
Theorem 2.6 (soundness and completeness). For all φ ∈ L,
⊢KD45G φ iff |=KD45G φ
As we said, epistemic logic rather follows the perfect external approach.
So now we are going to propose a formalism for the internal approach.
3. A semantics for the internal approach
To define a semantics for the internal approach in a multi-agent setting, we
will start from the standard view of an agent’s epistemic state as a set of
possible worlds (used in the AGM framework), and then extend it to the
multi-agent case.
But first we have to make some assumption. As we said in the previous
section, the internal approach has applications in artificial intelligence and
in cognitive psychology. So the objects we introduce should be essentially
finite. Indeed, computers cannot easily deal with infinite structures and a
human cognition is by nature finite. So the set Φ of propositional letters is
assumed to be finite.
3.1. Multi-agent possible world and internal model
In the AGM framework, one considers a single agent Y . The possible worlds
are supposed to represent how the agent Y perceives the surrounding world.
As she is the only agent, these possible worlds deal only with propositional
facts about the surrounding world. Now, if we suppose that there are other
agents than agent Y , a possible world for Y in that case should also deal with
how the other agents perceive the surrounding world. These “multi-agent”
possible worlds should then not only deal with propositional facts but also
with epistemic facts. So to represent a multi-agent possible world we need
to add a modal structure to our (single agent) possible worlds. We do so
as follows.
Definition 3.1. A multi-agent possible world (M,w) is a finite pointed
epistemic model M = (W,R, V,w) generated by w ∈ W such that Rj is
serial, transitive and euclidean for all j ∈ G, and
1. RY (w) = {w};
2. there is no v and j = Y such that w ∈ Rj(v).
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Let us have a closer look at the definition. Condition 2 will be motivated
later (after Definition 3.6), but note that any pointed epistemic model sat-
isfying the conditions of a multi-agent possible world except condition 2 is
bisimilar to a multi-agent possible world. Condition 1 ensures that in case Y
is the only agent then a multi-agent possible world boils down to a possible
world, as in the AGM theory. Condition 1 also ensures that in case Y assumes
that the situation is correctly represented by the multi-agent possible world
(M,w) then for her w is the (only) actual world. In fact the other possible
worlds of a multi-agent possible world are just present for technical reasons:
they express the other agents’ beliefs (in world w). One could get rid of the
condition that a multi-agent possible world (M,w) is generated by w but
the worlds which do not belong to the submodel generated by w would not
have neither philosophical nor technical motivation. Besides, for the same
reason that Φ is finite, a multi-agent possible world is also assumed to be
finite. Finally, notice that we assume that accessibility relations are serial,
transitive and euclidean. This means that the agents’ beliefs are consistent
and that agents ‘know’ what they believe and disbelieve (axioms D, 4 and 5
of Definition 2.5). These seem to be very natural constraints to impose on
the notion of belief. Intuitively, this notion of belief corresponds for exam-
ple to the kind of belief in a theorem that you have after having proved this
theorem and checked the proof several times. In the literature, this notion
of belief corresponds to Lenzen’s notion of conviction [19] or to Gardenfors’
notion of acceptance [15] or to Voorbraak’s notion of rational introspective
belief [28]. In fact, in all the agent theories the notion of belief satisfies these
constraints: in Cohen and Levesque’s theory of intention [11] or in Rao and
Georgeff BDI architecture [16] [26] or in Meyer et. al. KARO architecture
[27] [23] or in Wooldridge BDI logic LORA [29]. However, one should note
that all these agent theories follow the perfect external approach. This is of
course at odds with their intention to implement their theories in machines.
Remark 3.2. In this paper we deal only with the notion of belief but one
could add the notion of knowledge and also easily the notion of common
belief. Indeed, it might be interesting to express things such as ‘agent Y be-
lieves that agent j does not know p’ (even if this could be rephrased in terms
of beliefs). However, note that in an internal approach agent Y ’s (proper)
beliefs coincide with her knowledge. We refrain to introduce these notions
in order to highlight the main new ideas and because in most applications of
the internal approach the notion of knowledge is not essential. Nevertheless
all the results of this paper (including the axiomatization) would still hold
if we added a common belief operator to the language.
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a (single-agent) possible world:
 
 w : p,¬q
a multi-agent possible world:
 
 w
′ : p,¬q
Y

A





A

B






p, qA 		
A 
Y

B





 ¬p, q A


B
 Y 





p, q B


Y,A

¬p, q
A,B,Y
 ¬p,¬q
A,B,Y
 ¬p, q
B

Y,A

Figure 3. From possible world to multi-agent possible world
Example 3.3. We see in Figure 3 that a multi-agent possible world is really
a generalization of a possible world.
In the single agent case (in AGM belief revision theory), the epistemic
state of the agent Y is represented by a finite set of possible worlds which
expresses the fact that the agent might have some uncertainty about the
situation. In a multi-agent setting, this is very similar: the epistemic state
of the agent Y is represented by a (disjoint and) finite set of multi-agent
possible worlds.
Definition 3.4. An internal model is a disjoint and finite union of multi-
agent possible worlds.
An internal model will sometimes be noted (M,Wa) where Wa are the
roots of its multi-agent possible worlds.
Example 3.5. In Figure 4 is depicted an example of internal model. This
internal model represents how the situation described in Example 2.4 is
perceived by Yann. Yann does not know wether the coin is heads or tails
up (formally ¬BY p ∧ ¬BY ¬p). Indeed, in one multi-agent possible world
(on the left) p is true at the root and in the other (on the right) p is false
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 
 w : p
Y

A





A





 
 w
′ : ¬p
Y

A





A





p
A,Y
 A,Y
 ¬p
A,Y

 p
A,Y
 A,Y
 ¬p
A,Y


Figure 4. An internal model
at the root. Yann also believes that Alice does not know whether p is true or
false (formally BY (¬BAp ∧ ¬BA¬p)). Indeed, in both multi-agent possible
worlds, ¬BAp ∧ ¬BA¬p is true at the roots. Finally, Yann believes that
Ann believes that he does not know whether p is true or false (formally
BYBA(¬BY p ∧ ¬BY ¬p)) since BA(¬BY p ∧ ¬BY ¬p) is true at the roots of
both multi-agent possible worlds.
As we said in the introduction, the internal approach can be applied
in artificial intelligence. In this case, agent Y is an artificial agent (such
as a robot) that has an internal model ‘in her mind’. But to stick with a
more standard approach (used in the single agent case), we could perfectly
consider that agent Y has sentences from a particular language ‘in her mind’
and draws inferences from them. In that respect, this language could also
be used by agent Y in the former approach to perform some model checking
in her internal model in order to reason about the situation or to answer
queries. So in any case we do need to define a language.
3.2. Language for the internal approach
The well-formed formulas of the language for the internal approach are iden-
tical to the ones of the epistemic language of Definition 2.2. Its truth con-
ditions are nevertheless a bit different and are set out below.
Definition 3.6. Let (M, {w1, . . . , wn}) = {(M1, w1), . . . , (Mn, wn)} be an
internal model and let w ∈ M. Then w ∈ Mk for some k, with Mk =
(W k, Rk, V k). M, w |= φ is defined inductively as follows:
M, w |= ⊤
M, w |= p iff w ∈ V k(p)
M, w |= ¬φ iff not M, w |= φ
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M, w |= φ ∧ φ′ iff M, w |= φ and M, w |= φ′
M, w |= BY φ iff
{
for all wi ∈Wa, M, w
i |= φ if w ∈Wa
for all w′ ∈ RkY (w), M, w
′ |= φ if w /∈Wa
M, w |= Bjφ iff for all w
′ ∈ Rkj (w), M, w
′ |= φ if j = Y
We say that φ is true in (M,Wa) and write M,Wa |= φ when M, w |= φ
for all w ∈Wa.
Note that the truth condition for the operator BY is defined as if there
were accessibility relations indexed by Y between the roots of the multi-agent
possible worlds. Therefore we could actually set an accessibility relation in-
dexed by Y between the roots of an internal model. This would lead us to
define the notion of internal model of type 2, which is a multi-pointed epis-
temic model (M,Wa) whose accessibility relations are serial, transitive and
euclidean and such that for all wa ∈Wa, called the actual equivalence class,
RY (wa) = Wa. One can easily show that the notions of internal model and
internal model of type 2 are actually equivalent.3 Nevertheless, we prefer
to stick to our current representation of internal models because it is more
appropriate in the dynamic setting of autonomous agents. Indeed, an impor-
tant feature of multi-agent possible worlds warranted by condition 2 is their
modularity: the agents j’s beliefs about agent Y ’s beliefs (with j = Y ) of a
given multi-agent possible world stay the same whatever other multi-agent
possible world we add to this multi-agent possible world. This modularity,
which is the main motivation for introducing condition 2 in Definition 3.1,
plays an important role in the generalization of AGM belief revision theory
to the multi-agent case [3, 4].
Thanks to the truth conditions we can now define the notions of sat-
isfiability and validity of a formula. The truth conditions are defined for
any world of the internal model. However, the satisfiability and the validity
should not be defined relatively to any possible world of the internal model
(as it is usually done in epistemic logic) but only to the possible worlds of
the actual equivalence class. Indeed, these are the worlds that do count for
agent Y in an internal model: they are the worlds that agent Y actually con-
siders possible. The other possible worlds are just here for technical reasons
in order to express the other agents’ beliefs (in these worlds). This leads us
to the following definition of satisfiability and validity.
3The notion of equivalence between an internal model (M,Wa) and an internal model
of type 2 (M′,W ′a) can be defined naturally by stating that for every w ∈ Wa there is a
w′ ∈ W ′a which satisfies the same formulas as w, and vice versa.
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Definition 3.7. Let φ ∈ L. The formula φ is internally satisfiable if there
is an internal model (M,Wa) and there is w ∈Wa such thatM, w |= φ. The
formula φ is internally valid if for all internal models (M,Wa),M,Wa |= φ.
In this last case we write |=Int φ.
Remark 3.8. One could define the notions of internal satisfiability and in-
ternal validity differently. One could say that φ ∈ L is satisfiable if there
is an internal model (M,Wa) such that M,Wa |= φ. Then, following this
new definition, φ ∈ L is valid if for every internal model (M,Wa), there is
w ∈Wa such that M, w |= φ.
This second notion of internal validity corresponds to Ga¨rdenfors’ notion
of validity [15]. These two notions of internal validity also correspond to the
two notions of validity studied by Levi and Arlo Costa [2]: they call the first
one “positive validity” and the second one “negative validity”.
These two notions coincide if we use a propositional language but not
if we use an epistemic one (and therefore in particular not in a multi-agent
setting). Indeed, the Moore sentence p ∧ ¬BY p is positively satisfiable but
not negatively satisfiable. Nevertheless there are some connections between
them. We can indeed prove that φ ∈ L is positively valid if and only if BY φ
is negatively valid. Moreover, both have advantages and drawbacks. On the
one hand, positive validity is intuitive because it says that a formula φ is
valid if in every possible situation, the agent Y believes φ. However positive
satisfiability is less intuitive because φ is positively satisfiable if there exists
a situation in which the agent Y does not reject φ. On the other hand,
negative satisfiability is also intuitive because it says that φ is negatively
satisfiable if there exists a situation in which agent Y believes φ. However
negative validity is less intuitive because it says that φ is negatively valid if
in every situation agent Y does not reject φ.
In modal logic [8] there are two notions of semantic consequence. In the
internal approach we can also define two notions of semantic consequence.
Let C be a class of internal models, Σ ⊆ L and φ ∈ L. First, we say that φ is
a local internal consequence of Σ over C, written Σ |=C φ, if for all internal
models (M,Wa) ∈ C and all w ∈Wa, ifM, w |= Σ thenM, w |= φ. Second,
we say that φ is a global internal consequence of Σ over C, written Σ |=g
C
φ,
if for all internal models (M,Wa) ∈ C, if M,Wa |= Σ thenM,Wa |= φ. For
example, if we take any class C of internal models then it is not necessarily
the case that φ |=C BY φ, whereas we do have that φ |=
g
C
BY φ. Local internal
consequence can be associated to positive satisfiability and global internal
consequence can be associated to negative satisfiability of the above Remark.
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4. Some connections between the internal and the external
approaches
4.1. Internal approach and perfect external approach
Intuitively, there are some connections between the internal and the perfect
external approaches. Indeed, in the perfect external approach the modeler is
supposed to know perfectly how the agents perceive the surrounding world.
So from the model she builds we should be able to extract the internal model
of each agent. Likewise, it seems natural to claim that for the agent Y a
formula is true if and only if, objectively speaking, the agent Y believes this
formula. In this section we are going to formalize these intuitions. First we
define the notion of perfect external model.
Definition 4.1. A perfect external model (for the agents G) is a pointed
epistemic model (M,wa) = (W,R, V,wa) where wa ∈W and the accessibility
relations Rj are defined for j ∈ G, serial, transitive and euclidean.
So what we call a perfect external model is just a standard pointed epis-
temic model used in epistemic logic. A perfect external model is supposed
to model truthfully and from an external point of view how all the agents
involved in the same situation perceive the actual world (represented for-
mally by wa). This is thus simply the type of model built by the modeler in
the perfect external approach spelled out in the introduction. The language
and truth conditions for these perfect external models are the same as in
epistemic logic and are spelled out in Definitions 2.2 and 2.3. The notion of
perfect external validity is also the same as in epistemic logic and we say that
φ ∈ L is perfectly externally valid, noted |=Ext φ, if for all perfect external
model (M,w), M,w |= φ (and similarly for perfect external satisfiability).
Proposition 4.2. Let (M,wa) be a perfect external model (for the agents
G) and let j ∈ G. The model associated to agent j and (M,wa) is the
submodel of M generated by Rj(wa). It is an internal model (of type 2) and
Rj(wa) is its actual equivalence class.
Because the perfect external model is supposed to model truthfully the
situation, wa does correspond formally to the actual world. So Rj(wa) are
the worlds that agent j actually considers possible in this situation. In agent
j’s internal model pertaining to this situation, these worlds should then be
the worlds of the actual equivalence class. Finally, taking the submodel
generated by these worlds ensures that the piece of information encoded in
the worlds Rj(wa) in the perfect external model is kept unchanged in the
associated internal model.
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Figure 5. External model (M,wa) (left); Internal model associated to Yann (right), Inter-
nal model associated to Alice (left).
Example 4.3. In Figure 5 is depicted the ‘coin example’ after Alice’s cheat-
ing (see introduction). We can check that in the perfect external model,
Yann does not know whether the coin is heads or tails up and moreover
believes that Alice does not know neither. This is also true in the inter-
nal model (of type 2) associated to Yann. However, in the perfect external
model, Alice knows that the coin is heads up but this is false in the inter-
nal model associated to Yann and true in Alice’s internal model. Note that
the internal model associated to Yann is actually equivalent to the internal
model of Figure 4. Note also that the internal model associated to Alice is
the same as the perfect external model. This is due to the fact that Alice
perceived correctly what happened in the situation.
So we know from a perfect external model how to obtain the internal
model of each agent. But conversely, one obviously cannot obtain from the
internal model of one of the agents the perfect external model representing
the situation, which is in line with our intuitions. We can nevertheless get
the perfect external model if we suppose given the internal models of all
the agents and if we assume that the modeler knows the real state of the
world, more precisely she knows what propositional facts are true in the
actual world. We can then introduce a single world wa whose valuation Va
satisfies these propositional facts. The perfect external model is built by
setting accessibility relations indexed by j from wa to the actual equivalence
class of j’s internal model (of type 2), and so for each agent j ∈ G.
As we said in Section 3.2, the language of the internal approach is the
same as that of the perfect external approach. This enables us to draw easily
some connections between the two approaches.
Proposition 4.4. For all φ ∈ L, |=Int φ iff |=Ext BY φ.
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Intuitively, this result is correct: for you φ is true if and only if from an
external point of view you believe that φ is the case. (Note that this result
does not hold for the notion of negative validity.)
4.2. Internal approach and imperfect external approach
In both the internal approach and the imperfect external approach the mod-
eler might have some uncertainty about the situation to model (unlike the
perfect external approach). On the other hand, unlike the imperfect external
approach, in the internal approach the modeler is one of the agents G under
consideration and is therefore present in the formalism as agent Y ∈ G. So
in the imperfect internal approach and for this uncertain and external mod-
eler a possible representation of the situation is simply a perfect external
model. This leads us to define the notion of imperfect external model.
Definition 4.5. An imperfect external model (for the agents G) is a finite
set of perfect external models (for the agents G).4
Remark 4.6. Sometimes in the literature, the uncertainty of the modeler is
taken to be a property of the object of study itself. For example, in [17], some
events are deemed indeterministic whereas their ‘indeterminism’ is actually
due to a lack of knowledge about the events from the part of the modeler.
To avoid these kinds of confusion, one should instead clearly specify from
the start the modeling approach and the object of study.
There are obviously connections between the internal and the imperfect
external approaches. Indeed, as we just said the modeler-agent Y is present
in the internal model representing the situation. However, she could also
‘step back’ and model the situation from an external point of view as if she
was not present. In that case we would shift from an internal approach to
an imperfect external approach because the modeler has still some uncer-
tainty about the situation. From a semantic point of view, this change of
perspective simply amounts to suppress from an internal model (M,Wa)
the accessibility relations indexed by Y . This yields an imperfect exter-
nal model (for the agents G − {Y }) Imp(M,Wa). From a syntactic point
of view, this change of perspective somehow amounts to ‘forget’ agent Y
from formulas. There are obviously several ways to define from a formula
φ of L a formula Imp(φ) of the same language L but without BY operator.
We give in the appendix a proposal (inspired from the forget operator for
4Equivalently, an imperfect external model can be defined as a multi-pointed epistemic
model.
An Internal Version of Epistemic Logic 17
first-order logic originally introduced in [22]) such that if φ is true in the
internal model (M,Wa) then Imp(φ) is true in the imperfect external model
Imp(M,Wa), and such that Imp(φ) functions as a prime implicate of φ. Fi-
nally, the modeler in the imperfect external approach can really be seen as
the modeler-agent Y of the internal approach who would model the situa-
tion as if she was not present. Indeed, one can show that for any imperfect
external model (for the agents G−{Y }) (M′,W ′a) there is an internal model
(M,Wa) such that Imp(M,Wa) = (M
′,W ′a).
5. Axiomatization of the internal semantics
As we said earlier, instead of internal models, agent Y might have formulas
‘in her mind’ in order to represent the surrounding world. But to draw
inferences from them she needs a proof system. In other words, we still need
to axiomatize the internal semantics. That is what we are going to do now.
First some notations. Let Ext designate from now on the logic KD45G.
So for all φ ∈ L, ⊢Ext φ iff φ ∈ KD45G.
Definition 5.1. The internal logic Int is defined by the following axiom
schemes and inference rules:
T ⊢Int BY φ→ φ;
I-E ⊢Int φ for all φ ∈ L such that ⊢Ext φ;
MP if ⊢Int φ and ⊢Int φ→ ψ then ⊢Int ψ.
Let us have a closer look at the axiom schemes. The first one tells us that
for you, everything you believe is true. This is coherent if we construe the
notion of belief as conviction. The second one tells us that you should believe
everything which is objectively true, i.e. which is true independently of your
own subjectivity. This includes not only propositional tautologies but also
the way the other agents reason, like for example the fact that (for you) agent
j believes that everything she believes is true (because ⊢Ext Bj(Bjφ→ φ)).
Finally note that the necessitation rule (⊢Int φ implies ⊢Int Bjφ for all j) is
not present, which is intuitively correct. Indeed, if for you φ is true (i.e. you
believe φ) then in general there is no reason that you should believe that
the other agents believe φ as well. For example, BY φ→ φ is internally valid
but Bj(BY φ→ φ) (for j = Y ) should not be internally valid.
Theorem 5.2 (soundness and completeness). For all φ ∈ L,
|=Int φ iff ⊢Int φ.
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Proof Sketch. Soundness being straightforward, we only focus on com-
pleteness. Let φ be a Int-consistent formula. We need to prove that there is
an internal model (MInt,Wa), there is w ∈Wa such that MInt, w |= φ.
The model MInt is built as follows. Let Sub
+(φ) be all the subformulas
of φ with their negations. Let WInt be the set of maximal Int-consistent
subsets of Sub+(φ). Let WExt be the set of maximal Ext-consistent subsets
of Sub+(φ). For all Γ,Γ′ ∈ WInt ∪ WExt, let Γ/Bj = {ψ;Bjψ ∈ Γ} and
BjΓ = {Bjψ;Bjψ ∈ Γ} ∪ {¬Bjψ;¬Bjψ ∈ Γ}. We define the epistemic
model M = (W,R, V ) as follows: W = WInt ∪ WExt; for all j ∈ G and
Γ,Γ′ ∈W , Γ′ ∈ Rj(Γ) iff Γ/Bj = Γ
′/Bj and Γ/Bj ⊆ Γ
′; Γ ∈ V (p) iff p ∈ Γ.
One then proves by induction on ψ that for all ψ ∈ Sub+(φ), all Γ ∈W ,
M,Γ |= ψ iff ψ ∈ Γ. Then one can show that the accessibility relations Rj
are serial, transitive and euclidean and that for all Γ ∈WInt, Γ ∈ RY (Γ) (∗).
φ is a Int-consistent formula so there is Γ ∈ WInt such that φ ∈ Γ, i.e.
M,Γ |= φ. Let MInt be the submodel generated by RY (Γ). Then clearly
(M,Wa) withWa = RY (Γ) is an internal model. Finally, because Γ ∈ RY (Γ)
by (∗), there is Γ ∈Wa such that MInt,Γ |= φ.
From this axiomatization we can also prove that for all φ ∈ L, ⊢Int φ iff
⊢Ext BY φ and ⊢Int φ iff ⊢Int BY φ. This entails that in case Y is the only
agent then the internal logic Int is actually the logic S5, which is also the
logic advocated by Isaac Levi as the logic of ‘full belief’ (for the internal
approach) [21].
Finally the internal logic Int has also nice computational properties. Its
complexity turns out to be the same as in the perfect external approach.
Theorem 5.3. The validity problem for the internal logic Int is decidable
and PSPACE-complete.
Remark 5.4. Soon after Hintikka’s seminal book was published [18], an is-
sue now known as the logical omniscience problem was raised by Castan˜eda
about Hintikka’s epistemic logic: his “senses of ‘knowledge’ and ‘belief’ are
much too strong [. . . ] since most people do not even understand all deduc-
tions from premises they know to be true” [10]. It sparked a lot of work
aimed at avoiding this problem (such as [20], [13] or [12]).
While we believe that it is indeed a problem when we want to model
or describe human-like agents, we nevertheless believe that it is not really
a problem when we want to design artificial agents. Indeed, these agents
are supposed to reason according to our internal logic and because of its
decidability, artificial agents are in fact logically omniscient (even if it will
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take them some time to compute all the deductions given the complexity of
our logic).
6. Conclusion
In the introduction, we have identified what we claim to be the only three log-
ically possible modeling approaches by proceeding by successive dichotomies.
Such a classification has not been made before. Afterwards, we have focused
on the internal approach for which a logical formalism in a multi-agent set-
ting is missing, although such a formalism is crucial if we want to design
autonomous agents for instance. We have proposed one by generalizing the
possible world semantics of the AGM belief revision theory. This formalism
enabled us to draw some formal links between the external and the internal
approaches which are in line with our intuitions of these approaches. Finally,
we have provided an axiomatization of our formalism whose axioms are also
in line with our intuitions of the internal approach and showed that our logic
is decidable and PSPACE-complete.
In this paper we stressed the importance of specifying a modeling point
of view and an object of study when one wants to model epistemic situa-
tions. As it turns out, even if there are important conceptual and intuitive
differences between the internal and external approaches, the correspond-
ing formalisms are rather close and can be easily mapped one to the other.
However, it is this formally little but conceptually important difference which
allows to easily introduce dynamics in the internal approach and to gener-
alise the AGM results on belief revision to the multi-agent case, as we show
in [3, 4].
We finally sketch how our internal version of epistemic logic allows to
easily lift AGM belief revision theory to the multi-agent case (see [3, 4] for
more details). Following the belief base approach we represent a belief base
in a multi-agent setting by an epistemic formula ψ. Then we replace pos-
sible worlds in AGM theory by multi-agent possible worlds and we replace
the propositional language of AGM theory by the epistemic language. This
means that the models of the epistemic formula ψ are the multi-agent pos-
sible worlds that satisfy ψ. Then the definition of a faithful ordering ≤ψ
on multi-agent possible worlds for a given epistemic formula ψ is the same
as the definition of a faithful ordering ≤ψ′ on possible worlds for a given
propositional formula ψ′. Intuitively, (M,w) ≤ψ (M
′, w′) means that the
multi-agent possible world (M,w) is closer to ψ than the multi-agent possi-
ble world (M ′, w′). Likewise, the rationality postulates for belief revision in
a multi-agent setting are the same as in the AGM theory except that propo-
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sitional formulas are replaced by epistemic formulas. Then we can show, as
in the AGM theory, that a revision operator satisfies these postulates in a
multi-agent setting if and only if the models of the revision of the belief base
ψ by the epistemic formula φ are the multi-agent possible worlds that satisfy
φ and which are minimal with respect to ≤ψ.
A. Forgetting agents
We define an operator Imp on formulas which somehow ‘forgets’ agent Y
from formulas. Let φ ∈ L and let φ1, . . . , φn be the subformulas of φ of the
form BY ψ not within the scope of another operator BY . We define Imp(φ) =
Imp(φ, {φ1, . . . , φn}) ∈ LG−Y inductively as follows: Imp(φ, {ψ}) = φ[ψ/⊤]∨
φ[ψ/⊥] (where φ[ψ/⊤], resp. φ[ψ/⊥], is the formula φ where ψ has been
substituted by ⊤, resp. by ⊥) and Imp(φ, {ψ} ∪ S) = Imp(Imp(φ, {ψ}), S).
We then have the following result.
Proposition A.1. For all φ ∈ L and φ′ ∈ LG−Y ,
1. |=Ext φ→ Imp(φ);
2. If |=Ext φ→ φ
′ then |=Ext Imp(φ)→ φ
′
3. (M,Wa) |= φ
′ iff Imp(M,Wa) |= φ
′.5
Proof Sketch. For item 1, we prove by induction on the degree of φ ∈ L
that there is χφ ∈ L such that |=Ext (χφ → (φ ↔ φ[BY ψ/⊤])) ∧ (¬χφ →
(φ↔ φ[BY ψ/⊥])). We then get the result using |=Ext χφ ∨ ¬χφ and modus
ponens. For item 2, if (M,w) is a perfect external model for the set of
agents G − {Y } such that M,w |= φ[BY ψ/⊤] ∨ φ[BY ψ/⊥], we can easily
build a perfect external model (M ′, w′) for the set of agents G satisfying
the same formulas of LG−Y as (M,w) and such that M
′, w′ |= φ. Therefore
M ′, w′ |= φ′ by assumption, and so M,w |= φ′ because φ′ ∈ LG−Y .
The first two items are valid in the external approach but also hold if
we use instead the internal validity. The first one intuitively expresses that
our forgetting operation Imp is sound. The second one intuitively expresses
that Imp(φ) is the formula of LG−Y derived from φ which retains from φ the
most important amount of information possible about the agents G different
from Y (therefore functioning like a prime implicate).
5Imp(M,Wa) |= φ means that φ is true at the root of each perfect external model of
Imp((M),Wa).
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